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 This paper studies the challenges in the current 
intrusion detection system and comparatively analyzes the 
active and passive response systems. The paper studies the 
existing IDS and their usefulness in detecting and preventing 
attacks in any type of network and control traffic with the 
performance of the system to be improved. The study also 
evaluates the emerging avenues in Intrusion Detection System 
and explores the possible future avenues in intrusion detection 
scheme. It is observed that the detection-based systems have 
started to gain popularity in the IT security domain. The paper 
highlights the need to implement an appropriately configured 
IDS since an optimally configured IDS deters hackers, thus, 
reducing the need for investigation by security experts for 
security violations. 
Keywords: Intrusion detection system, response 
systems, detection-based systems, configured IDS, 
security violations. 
I. Introduction 
ata systems and computer networks are central 
in modern social club. The more data stored and 
processed, the more significant it is to secure 
computer systems. Widespread use and proliferation of 
computer network has increased the attacks on new 
age information systems. These attacks are attempts to 
take illegal/unauthorized access to information available 
with an intention of misusing the same. These attacks 
result in major financial loss to organizations in the form 
of mistrust of customers, loosing goodwill. Any set of 
processes that attempt to compromise the integrity, 
confidentiality, or availability of a computer resource, is 
known as intrusion (Zamboni, 2001). Generally an 
intruder is defined as a system, program or person who 
tries to and may become successful to stop into an 
information system or perform an action legally not 
allowed (Graham, 2000). 
The act of detecting actions that try to 
compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of 
a computer resource can be referred as intrusion 
detection (Zamboni, 2001). Intrusion Detection (ID) 
refers to all processes used in discovering unauthorized 
uses of network or computer devices through 
specifically designed software with a sole purpose of 
detecting unusual or abnormal activity. Denning (1987) 
proposes intrusion detection as an approach to counter, 
 
  
 
   
 
the information processing system and networking 
attacks and misuses (Denning, 1987 and Botha & 
Solms, 2004).  
Intrusion detection is carried out by an intrusion 
detection scheme. There are many commercial intrusion 
detection systems available and most of these 
commercial implementations are relatively ineffective 
and insufficient, which gives rise to the need for 
research on more dynamic intrusion detection schemes. 
An intrusion detection system is a device or software 
application that monitors network and/or system actions 
for malicious actions or policy violations and produces 
reports (Scarfone and Mell, 2007). IDS is also 
understood as an instrument that complements a 
spacious scope of users used to experience some tier 
of protection (Vigna et al, 2002). 
For an IDS to be efficient, it must run 
continuously adapt to behavioral alterations and large 
sums of data, be configurable, do not apply too much 
memory resources of the machine and after system 
failures, be reusable without new learning (Zamboni, 
1998). 
Traditional methods for intrusion detection are 
based on extensive knowledge of attack signatures that 
are provided by human experts. The signature database 
has to be manually revised for each new type of 
intrusion that is discovered. A significant limitation of 
signature-based methods is that they cannot detect 
novel attacks. In addition, once a new attack is 
discovered and its signature developed, often there is a 
substantial latency in its deployment. These limitations 
have led to an increasing interest in intrusion detection 
techniques based upon data mining, which generally fall 
into one of two categories: misuse detection and 
anomaly detection.  
To prevent attacks or reduce their severity, 
many solutions exist, but no one can be considered 
satisfactory and all over. The intrusion detection 
schemes are one of the most efficient solution. Their 
purpose is to recognize intrusions or intrusion attempts 
by users or abnormal behavior by the identification of an 
onslaught from the stream network data. Different 
methods and approaches are available in the design of 
intrusion detection systems. 
There are a variety of tools providing a certain 
level of comfort with acceptable risks used in the 
defence and surveillance of computer networks. 
Defence-in-Depth is a term encompassing 
D 
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comprehensive analyst training, hardware deployed in 
strategic positions and a strong security policy 
necessary for achieving this objective. There are tools 
available to reach this goal. The aggregation of data 
comes from routers, the host itself, firewalls, virus 
scanners and IDS, the tool strictly designed to catch 
known attacks (SANS Institute, 2001). 
Since the introduction of IDS, Cyber-attacks 
have been a real threat. With their wide variety and 
specialty, they can have catastrophic consequences. To 
prevent attacks or reduce their severity, many solutions 
exist, but no one can be considered satisfactory and 
complete. The intrusion detection systems are among 
the most effective solution. Their role is to recognize 
intrusions or intrusion attempts by users or abnormal 
behavior by the recognition of an attack from the stream 
network data.  
Anderson (1972) delineates the fact the United 
States Air Force [USAF] “became increasingly aware of 
computer security problems. This problem feels virtually 
in every aspect of USAF operations and governance”. 
USAF faces the daunting tasks of providing 
shared use of their computer systems, which contained 
various levels of classifications in a need to know 
environment with a user base holding various levels of 
security clearance. Thirty years ago, this created a grave 
problem that is still with us today. The problem remains: 
“How to safely secure separate classification domains 
on the same network without compromising security?” 
(Anderson, 1972). 
Denning (1984) and Neumann (1986) undertake 
the R&D project with the first model of a real-time IDS. 
This prototype was named the Intrusion Detection 
Expert System (IDES). This IDES was initially a rule-
based expert system trained to detect known malicious 
activity.   
 
(a) Host-Based 
(b) Network-Based 
(c) Anomaly Detection Model 
(d) Misuse Detection Model 
These models are used as terms in Intrusion 
Detection user and research community. People from 
different areas have researched and developed few 
systems to deal with these kind of issues (SANS 
Institute, 2001) 
a) Why should Intrusion Detection Systems be used? 
Intrusion detection allows organizations to 
protect their systems from the threats that come with 
increasing network connectivity and reliance on 
information systems. Passed on the grade and nature of 
modern network security threats, the question to security 
professionals should not be whether to use intrusion 
detection, but which intrusion detection features and 
capabilities to employ.   
IDSs have gained acceptance as a necessary 
addition to every organization’s security infrastructure. 
Despite the documented contributions intrusion 
detection technologies make to system security, in 
many organizations one must still justify the acquisition 
of IDSs (Bace and Mell, 2001) There are several 
compelling reasons to acquire and use IDSs: 
(a) To prevent problem behaviors by increasing the 
perceived danger of discovery and punishment for 
those who would assault or otherwise misuse the 
scheme. 
(b) To detect attacks and other security violations that 
are not prevented by other protection criteria. 
(c) To identify and handle with the preambles to attacks 
(commonly viewed as network probes and other 
“doorknob rattling” activities). 
(d) To document the existing threat to an 
establishment. 
(e) To act as quality control for security design and 
administration, especially of large and complex 
enterprises. 
(f) To provide useful information about intrusions that 
do take place, allowing improved diagnosis, 
recovery, and correction of causative factors. 
b) Major types of IDSs 
IDSs have various types, characterized by 
different monitoring and analysis approaches. Each 
approach has inherent advantages and disadvantages. 
Furthermore, all approaches can be described in terms 
of a generic process model for IDSs. (Bace & Mell, 
2001) 
Many IDSs (Bace & Mell, 2001) can be 
described in terms of three fundamental functional 
components:  
• Information Sources – the different sources of event 
information used to determine whether an intrusion 
has taken place.  These roots can be traced from 
different stages of the system, with network, host, 
and application monitoring. On this basis, the 
following types of IDS have been observed –  
o Network-based IDSs: The majority of commercial 
intrusion detection systems is network based. These 
IDSs detect attacks by capturing and analyzing 
network packets. Listening on a network segment or 
switch, one network-based IDS can monitor the 
network traffic affecting multiple hosts that are 
connected to the network segment, thereby 
protecting those hosts.   Network-based IDSs often 
consist of a set of single-purpose sensors or hosts 
placed at various points in a network. These units 
monitor network traffic, performing local analysis of 
that traffic and reporting attacks to a central 
management console. As the sensors are limited to 
running the IDS, they can be more easily secured 
against attack. Many of these detectors are 
designed to function in “stealth” mode, in 
© 2016   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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Some of the most common terms in context of 
IDS are as follows:
 
 
 
 
 
parliamentary procedure to attain it more 
unmanageable for an assailant to influence their 
presence and placement. 
o Host-based IDSs: Host-based IDSs operate on 
information collected from within an individual 
computer system (Application-based IDSs are 
actually a subset of host-based IDSs). This vantage 
point allows host based IDSs to analyze activities 
with great reliability and precision, determining 
exactly which processes and users are involved in a 
particular attack on the operating system. 
Furthermore, unlike network based IDSs, host-
based IDSs can “see” the outcome of an attempted 
attack, as they can directly access and monitor the 
data files and system processes usually targeted by 
attacks. Host-based IDSs normally utilize 
information sources of two types, operating system 
audit trails, and system logs. Operating system 
audit trails are usually generated at the innermost 
(kernel) level of the operating system, and are 
therefore more detailed and better protected than 
system logs.  However, system logs are much less 
obtuse and a lot smaller than audit trails, and are 
furthermore far easier to grasp. Some server-based 
IDSs are designed to sustain a centralized IDS 
management and accounting infrastructure that can 
tolerate a single management console to pass over 
many hosts. Others generate messages in formats 
that are compatible with network management 
systems. 
o Application-based IDSs: Application-based IDSs are 
a special subset of host-based IDSs that analyze 
the events transpiring within a software application. 
The most common information sources used by 
application-based IDSs are the application’s 
transaction log files. The ability to interface with the 
application directly, with significant domain- or 
application-specific knowledge included in the 
analysis engine, allows application-based IDSs to 
detect suspicious behavior due to authorized users 
exceeding their mandate. This is because such 
problems are more likely to appear in the interaction 
between the user, the data, and the application. 
• Analysis – the part of intrusion detection systems 
that actually organizes and makes sense of the 
events derived from the information sources, 
deciding when those events indicate that intrusions 
are occurring or have already taken place. The most 
common analysis approaches are misuse detection 
and anomaly detection. The following forms of IDS 
are observed on this basis –  
o Misuse Detection: Misuse detectors analyze system 
activity, looking for events or sets of events that 
match a predefined pattern of events that describe 
a known attack. As the patterns corresponding to 
known attacks are called signatures, misuse 
detection is sometimes called “signature-based 
detection.” The most common form of misuse 
detection used in commercial products specifies 
each pattern of events corresponding to an attack 
as a separate signature. Nevertheless, in that 
respect are more sophisticated approaches to 
doing misuse detection (called “state-based” 
analysis techniques) that can leverage a single 
signature to find groups of approaches. 
o Anomaly Detection: Anomaly detectors identify 
abnormal, unusual behavior (anomalies) on a host 
or network. They operate on the assumption that 
attacks are different from “normal” (legitimate) 
activity and can therefore be detected by systems 
that distinguish these conflicts. Anomaly detectors 
construct profiles representing normal behavior of 
users, hosts, or network connections. These profiles 
are built from historical information accumulated 
over a period of normal functioning.  The detectors 
then collect event data and use a variety of 
measures to determine when monitored activity 
deviates from the norm. 
• Response – the set of actions that the system takes 
once it detects intrusions. These are typically 
grouped into active and passive measures, with 
active measures involving some automated 
intervention on the part of the system, and passive 
measures involving reporting IDS findings to 
humans, who are then expected to take action 
based on those reports. The forms of IDS under this 
section are as under –  
o Active IDS: Active IDS responses are automated 
actions taken when certain types of intrusions are 
detected. In that respect are three categories of 
active responses. 
 Collect additional information over time: In the IDS 
case, this might involve increasing the level of 
sensitivity of information sources (for instance, 
turning up the number of events logged by an 
operating system audit trail, or increasing the 
sensitivity of a network monitor to capture all  
packets, not just those targeting a  particular port or 
target system.) Collecting additional information is 
helpful for several reasons. The additional 
information collected can help resolve the detection 
of the attack. (Assisting the system in diagnosing 
whether an attack did or did not take place.) This 
option also allows the organization to gather 
information that can be used to support 
investigation and apprehension of the attacker, and 
to support criminal and civil legal remedies.   
 Technological Change and the Environment: 
Another active response is to stop an attack in 
advance and then block subsequent access by the 
assailant. Typically, IDSs do not possess the power 
© 2016   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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to stop a specific person’s access, but instead 
block Internet Protocol (IP) addresses from which 
the attacker seems to be doing. It is very difficult to 
block a determined and knowledgeable attacker, 
but IDSs can often deter expert attackers or stop 
novice hackers by (a) injecting TCP reset packets 
into the attacker’s connection to the victim system, 
thereby terminating the connection ; (b) 
reconfiguring routers and firewalls to block packets 
from the attacker’s apparent location (IP address or 
site); (c) reconfiguring routers and firewalls to block 
the network ports, protocols, or services being used 
by an attacker; (d) in extreme situations, re-
configuring routers and firewalls to sever all 
connections that use certain network interfaces. 
 Take Action Against the Intruder: Some who follow 
intrusion detection discussions, particularly in 
information warfare circles, consider that the first 
option in active response is to call for action against 
the trespasser. The most aggressive form of this 
response involves launching attacks against or 
attempting to actively gain information about the 
attacker’s host or site.  However tempting it might 
be, this response is ill advised. Due to legal 
ambiguities about civil liability, this option can 
represent a bigger peril that the attack it is 
designated to stop. The first reason for approaching 
this option with a large deal of carefulness is that it 
may be illegal. Furthermore, as many attackers use 
false network addresses when attacking systems, it 
carries with it a high risk of causing damage to 
innocent Internet sites and users. Finally, strike back 
can escalate the attack, provoking an attacker who 
originally thought just to browse a site to contain 
more aggressive activity. 
o Passive IDS: Passive IDS responses provide 
information to system users, relying on humans to 
take subsequent action based on that information. 
Many commercial IDSs rely solely on passive 
responses. 
 Alerts and Notifications: Alerts and notifications are 
generated by IDSs to inform users when attacks are 
discovered. Most commercial IDSs allow users a 
large deal of latitude in finding out how and when 
alarms are generated and to whom they are 
exhibited. The most usual kind of alarm is an 
onscreen alert or popup window. This is displayed 
on the IDS console or on other systems as specified 
by the user during the configuration of the IDS. The 
information provided in the alarm message varies 
widely, ranging from a notification that an intrusion 
has taken place to extremely detailed messages 
outlining the IP addresses of the source and target 
of the attack, the specific attack tool used to gain 
access, and the outcome of the attack. Another set 
of options that are of utility to large or distributed 
organizations are those involving remote notification 
of alarms or alerts.  These allow organizations to 
configure the IDS so that it sends alerts to cellular 
phones and pagers carried by incident response 
teams or system security personnel. 
 SNMP Traps and Plug-ins: Some commercial IDSs 
are designed to generate alarms and alerts, 
reporting them to a network management system. 
These uses SNMP traps and messages to post 
alarms and alerts to central network management 
consoles, where they can be serviced by network 
operations personnel. Several benefits are 
associated with this reporting scheme, including the 
ability to adapt the entire network infrastructure to 
respond to a detected attack, the ability to shift the 
processing load associated with an active response 
to a system other than the one being targeted by 
the attack, and the ability to use common 
communications channels. (Bace and Mell, 2001) 
c) IDS Framework/ Architecture 
Various intrusion detection system (IDS) 
frameworks/architectures have evolved over a period of 
time. These broadly include the following. 
• The STAT Framework – The Web STAT intrusion 
detection system has been developed using the 
STAT framework (Vigna et al., 2002). The framework 
provides the implementation of a domain-
independent analysis engine that can be extended 
in a well-defined way to perform intrusion detection 
analysis in specific application domains. The STAT 
framework centres around an intrusion modeling 
technique that characterizes attacks in terms of 
transitions between the security states of a system. 
This approach is supported by the STATL attack 
modeling language. The STATL language provides 
constructs to represent an attack as a composition 
of states and transitions. States are used to 
characterize different snapshots of a system during 
the evolution of an attack. Obviously, it is not 
feasible to represent the complete state of a system 
(e.g., volatile memory, file system); therefore, a 
STATL scenario uses variables to record just those 
parts of the system state that are needed to define 
an attack signature (e.g., the value of a counter or 
the source of an HTTP request). A transition has an 
associated action that is a specification of the event 
that can cause the scenario to move to a new state. 
For example, an action can be the opening of a TCP 
connection or the execution of a CGI script. The 
space of possible relevant actions is constrained by 
a transition assertion, which is a filter condition on 
the events that can possibly match the action. For 
example, an assertion can require that a TCP 
connection be opened with a specific destination 
port or that a CGI application be invoked with 
specific parameters. It is possible for several 
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occurrences of the same attack to be active at the 
same time. A STATL attack scenario, therefore, has 
an operational semantics in terms of a set of 
instances of the same scenario specification. The 
scenario specification represents the scenario’s 
definition and global environment, and a scenario 
instance represents a particular attack that is 
currently in progress. 
The STAT Core module is the run-time for the 
STATL language. The Core implements the concepts of 
state, transition, instance, timer, etc. In addition, the 
STAT Core is responsible for obtaining events from the 
target environment, and matching this event stream 
against the actions and assertions corresponding to 
transitions in the active attack scenarios. The STATL 
language and the Core runtime are domain 
independent. They do not support any domain-specific 
features, which may be necessary to perform intrusion 
detection analysis in particular domains or 
environments. For example, network events such as an 
IP packet or the opening of a TCP connection cannot be 
represented in STATL natively. Therefore, the STAT 
framework provides a number of mechanisms to extend 
the STATL language and the runtime to match the 
characteristics of a specific target domain. 
In summary, a STAT-based sensor is created by 
developing a language extension that describes the 
particular domain of the application, an event provider 
that retrieves information from the environment and 
produces STAT events, and attack scenarios that 
describe attacks in terms of state transition models of 
STAT events. In addition, it is possible to create 
response libraries that are specific to a certain domain. 
The response functions in the library can be dynamically 
associated with the states modeled in the attack 
scenarios. 
• Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) – 
DIDS is the second major IDS system having 
evolved in recent times (Snapp et. al., 2003). The 
DIDS architecture combines distributed monitoring 
and data reduction with centralized data analysis. 
This approach is unique among current IDS’s. The 
components of DIDS are the DIDS director, a single 
host monitor per host. and a single LAN monitor for 
each broadcast LAN segment in the monitored 
network. DIDS can potentially handle hosts without 
monitors since the LAN monitor can report on the 
network activities of such hosts. The host and LAN 
monitors are primarily responsible for the collection 
of evidence of unauthorized or suspicious activity, 
while the DIDS director is primarily responsible for 
its evaluation. Reports are sent independently and 
asynchronously from the host and LAN monitors to 
the DIDS director through a communications 
infrastructure. 
High level communication protocols between 
the components are based on the ISO Common 
Management Information Protocol (CMIP) 
recommendations, allowing for future inclusion of CMIP 
management tools as they become useful. The 
architecture also provides for bidirectional 
communication between the DIDS director and any 
monitor in the configuration. This communication 
consists primarily of notable events and anomaly reports 
from the monitors. The director can also make requests 
for more detailed information from the distributed 
monitors via a "GET" directive, and issue commands to 
have the distributed monitors modify their monitoring 
capabilities via a "SET" directive. A large amount of low 
level filtering and some analysis is performed by the 
host monitor to minimize the use of network bandwidth 
in passing evidence to the director.
 
The DIDS director consists of three major 
components that are all located on the same dedicated 
workstation. Because the components are logically 
independent processes, they could be distributed as 
well. The communications manager is responsible for 
the transfer of data between the director and each of the 
host and the LAN monitors. It accepts the notable event 
records from each of the host and LAN monitors and 
sends them to the expert system. On behalf of the 
expert system or user interface, it is also able to send 
requests to the host and LAN monitors for more 
information regarding a particular subject. The expert 
system is responsible for evaluating and reporting on 
the security state of the monitored system. It receives 
the reports from the host and the LAN monitors, and, 
based on these reports, it makes inferences about the 
security of each individual host, as well as the system as 
a whole. The expert system is a rule-based system with 
simple learning capabilities. The director’s user interface 
allows the System Security Officer (SSO) interactive 
access to the entire system. The SSO is able to watch 
activities on each host, watch network traffic (by setting 
"wire-taps"),
 
and request more specific types of 
information from the monitors.
 
The host monitor is currently installed on Sun 
SPARC
 
stations running SunOS 4.0.x with the Sun C2 
security package. Through the C2 security package, the 
operating system produces audit records for virtually 
every transaction on the system. These transactions 
include file accesses, system calls, process executions, 
and logins. The contents of the Sun C2 audit record are: 
record type, record event, time, real user ID, audit user 
ID, effective user ID, real group ID, process ID, error 
code, return value, and label.
 
All possible transactions fall into one of a finite 
number of events formed by the cross product of the 
actions and the domains, and each event may also 
succeed or fail. Note that no distinction is made 
between files, directories or devices, and that all of 
these are treated simply as objects. Not every action is 
© 2016   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
  
  
 
  
5
Y
e
a
r
20
16
Towards Configured Intrusion Detection Systems
applicable to every object; for example, the terminate 
action is applicable only to processes. The choice of 
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
V
I 
Is
su
e 
IV
 V
er
sio
n 
I 
  
 (
)
E
 
 
 
 
 
these domains and actions is somewhat arbitrary in that 
one could easily suggest both finer and coarser grained 
partitions. However, they capture most of the interesting 
behavior for intrusion detection and correspond 
reasonably well with what other researchers in this field 
have found to be of interest. By mapping an infinite 
number of transactions to a finite number of events, not 
only can the operating system dependencies be 
removed, but also restrict the number of permutations 
that the expert system will have to deal with. The 
concept of the domain is one of the keys to detecting 
abuses. Using the domain allows us to make assertions 
about the nature of a user’s behavior in a straightforward 
and systematic way. Although this leads to loss of some 
details provided by the
 
raw audit information, that is 
more than made up for by the increase in portability, 
speed, simplicity, and generality.
 
The LAN monitor uses heuristics in an attempt 
to identify the likelihood that a particular connection 
represents intrusive behavior. These heuristics consider 
the capabilities of each of the network services, the level 
of authentication required for each of the services, the 
security level for each machine on the network, and 
signatures of past attacks. The abnormality of a 
connection is based on the probability of that particular 
connection occurring and the behavior of the connection 
itself. Upon request, the LAN monitor is also able to 
provide a more detailed examination of any connection, 
including capturing every character crossing the network 
(i.e., a wire-tap). This capability can be used to support 
a directed investigation of a particular subject or object. 
Like the host monitor, the LAN monitor forwards relevant 
security information to the director through its LAN 
agent.
 
DIDS utilizes a rule-based (or production) expert 
system. The expert system is currently written in Prolog, 
and much of the form of the rule base comes from 
Prolog and the logic notation that Prolog implies. The 
expert system uses rules derived from the hierarchical
 
Intrusion Detection Model (IDM). The IDM describes the 
data abstractions used in inferring an attack on a 
network of computers. That is, it describes the 
transformation from the distributed raw audit data to 
high level hypotheses about intrusions and about the 
overall security of the monitored environment. In 
abstracting and correlating data from the distributed 
sources, the model builds a virtual machine which 
consists of all the connected hosts as well as the 
network itself. This unified view of the distributed system 
simplifies the recognition of intrusive behavior which 
spans individual hosts. The model is also applicable to 
the trivial network of a single computer.
 •
 
Intrusion Detection System for Cloud Computing –
 
Cloud computing provides application and storage 
services on remote servers (Shelke, Sontakke, 
Gawande, 2012). The clients do not have to worry 
about its maintenance and software or hardware up-
gradations. Cloud model works on the „concept of 
virtualization‟
 
of resources, where a hypervisor 
server in cloud data center hosts a number of 
clients on one physical machine. Deploying HIDS in 
hypervisor or host machine would allow the 
administrator to monitor the hypervisor and virtual 
machines on that hypervisor. But with the rapid flow 
of high volume
 
of data as in cloud model, there 
would be issues of performance like overloading of 
VM hosting IDS and dropping of data packets. Also 
if host is compromised by an offending attack the 
HIDS employed on that host would be neutralized. 
In such a scenario, a network based IDS would be 
more suitable for deployment in cloud like 
infrastructure. NIDS would be placed outside the VM 
servers on bottle neck of network points such as 
switch, router or gateway for network traffic 
monitoring to have a global view of the
 
system. 
Such NIDS would still be facing the issue of large 
amount of data through network access rate in 
cloud environment. To handle a large number of 
data packets flow in such an environment a multi-
threaded IDS approach has been proposed in this 
paper.
 
The multi-threaded IDS would be able to 
process large amount of data and could reduce the 
packet loss. After an efficient processing the 
proposed IDS would pass the monitored alerts to a 
third party monitoring service, who would in turn 
directly inform the cloud user about their system 
under attack. The third party monitoring service 
would also provide expert advice to cloud service 
provider for mis-configurations and intrusion loop 
holes in the system. The cloud user accesses its 
data on remote servers at
 
service provider's site 
over the cloud network. User requests and actions 
are monitored and logged through a multi-threaded 
NIDS. The alert logs are readily communicated to 
cloud user with an expert advice for cloud service 
provider. 
 Proposed multi-threaded NIDS model for 
distributed cloud environment is based on three 
modules: capture & queuing module, analysis/ 
processing module and reporting module. The capture 
module, receives the in-bound and out-bound (ICMP, 
TCP, IP, UDP) data packets. The captured data packets 
are sent to the shared queue for analysis. The analysis 
and process module receives data packets from the 
shared queue and analyze it against signature base and 
a pre-defined rule set. Each process in a shared queue 
can have multiple threads which work in a collaborative 
fashion to improve the system performance. The main 
process will receive TCP, IP, UDP and ICMP packets 
and multiple threads would concurrently process and 
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match those packets against pre-defined set of rules. 
Through an efficient matching and analysis the bad 
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packets would be identified and alerts generated. 
Reporting module would read the alerts from shared 
queue and prepares alert reports. The third party 
monitoring and advisory service having experience and 
resources would immediately generate a report for cloud 
user's information and sends a comprehensive expert 
advisory report for cloud service provider. Figure above 
depicts the flow chart of proposed multi-threaded Cloud 
IDS.
 •
 
An implementation of intrusion detection system 
using genetic algorithm –
 
Hoque, Mukit and Bikas 
(2012)
 
identify the following problems with the 
existing systems.
 
o
 
Snort:
 
A free and open source network intrusion 
detection and prevention system, was created by 
Martin Roesch in 1998 and now developed by 
Sourcefire. In 2009, Snort entered InfoWorld's Open 
Source Hall of Fame as one of the “greatest open 
source software of all time”. Through protocol 
analysis, content searching, and various pre-
processors, Snort detects thousands of worms, 
vulnerability exploit attempts, port scans, and other 
suspicious behavior.
 
o
 
OSSEC:
 
An open source host-based intrusion 
detection system, performs log analysis, integrity 
checking, rootkit detection, time-based alerting and 
active response. In addition to its IDS functionality, it 
is commonly used as a SEM/SIM solution. Because 
of its powerful log analysis engine, ISPs, universities 
and data centers are running OSSEC HIDS to 
monitor and analyze their firewalls, IDSs, web 
servers and authentication logs.
 
o
 
OSSIM:
 
The goal of Open Source Security 
Information Management, OSSIM is to provide a 
comprehensive compilation of tools which, when 
working together, grant network/security admini-
strators with a detailed view over each and every 
aspect of networks, hosts, physical access devices, 
and servers. OSSIM incorporates several other 
tools, including Nagios and OSSEC HIDS.
 
o
 
Bro:
 
An open-source, Unix-based network intrusion 
detection system Bro detects intrusions by first 
parsing network traffic to extract its application-level 
semantics and then executing event-oriented 
analyzers that compare the activity with patterns 
deemed troublesome.
 
o
 
Fragroute/Fragrouter: A network intrusion detection 
evasion toolkit. Fragrouter helps an attacker launch 
IP-based attacks while avoiding detection. It is
 
part 
of the NIDS bench suite of tools by Dug Song.
 
o
 
BASE: The Basic Analysis and Security Engine, 
BASE is a PHP-based analysis engine to search 
and process a database of security events 
generated by various IDSs, firewalls and network 
monitoring tools. A Genetic Algorithm (GA) is a 
programming technique that mimics biological 
evolution as a problem-solving strategy. It is based 
on Darwinian’s principle of evolution and survival of 
fittest to optimize a population of candidate 
solutions towards a predefined fitness. When using 
GA for solving various problems three factors will 
have vital impact on the effectiveness of the 
algorithm and also of the applications. These 
include:
 
 
the fitness function;
 

 
the representation of individuals; 
 

 
the
 
GA parameters. The determination of these 
factors often depends on applications and/or 
implementation.
 The present paper aims to understand the 
emerging avenues in Intrusion Detection System, as to 
what all models, architectures are available for detecting 
intrusions and how to prevent those intrusions to occur 
in any network traffic. The paper further focuses on 
challenges in the current intrusion detection system 
while also comparatively analyzing the Active and 
Passive Response Systems. Finally, the paper explores 
the possible future avenues in intrusion detection 
scheme.
 II.
 
Findings and Discussion
 IDS is
 
an emerging trend in network security as 
intrusions are increasing day by day due to internet 
availability with high level of usage among people 
across the globe. With improvements in the network is 
required to protect one`s information lying unsecured 
over the internet and should not be revealed to 
unauthorized people or groups. Cloud computing is 
another emerging trend which has shot up demand of 
security over free network, i.e. Internet (Shelke et. al, 
2012).
 
On the basis of analysis done from available
 
systems in Intrusion Detection proposed by people in 
different geographical areas, different network or 
environment requires a different level of security and 
infrastructure is another concern to implement IDS or 
related services. 
 
Currently, networked computer systems play an 
ever more major function in our fellowship and its 
economic system. They have become the targets of a 
wide array of malicious threats that invariably turn into 
real intrusions. This is the reason computer security has 
become a vital concern for network practitioner. Too 
often, intrusions cause disaster inside LANs and the 
time and cost to renovate the damage can grow to 
extreme proportions. Instead of using passive measures 
to repair and patch security hole once they have been 
exploited, it is more efficient to take up a proactive 
measure to intrusions (Gomez, Dasgupta, 2002).
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Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are primarily 
focused on identifying probable incidents, monitoring 
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information about them, tries to stop them, and 
reporting them to security administrators in real-time 
environment, and those that exercise audit data with 
some delay (non-real-time). The latter approach would 
in turn delay the instance of detection. In addition, 
organizations apply IDSs for other reasons, such as
 classifying problems with security policies, documenting 
existing attacks, and preventing individuals from 
violating security policies. IDSs have become a basic 
addition to the security infrastructure of almost every 
organization (Hassan, 2013). A usual Intrusion Detection 
System is demonstrated in Figure 1 below.
 
 
Figure 1 
Note: The arrow lines symbolize the amount of information flowing from one component to another 
Very Simple Intrusion Detection System 
One of the major problems encountered by IDS 
is large number of false positive alerts that is the alerts 
that are mistakenly analyzed normal traffic as security 
violations. An ideal IDS does not produce false or 
inappropriate alarms. In practice, signature based IDS 
found to produce more false alarms than expected. This 
is due to the very general signatures and poor built in 
verification tool to authenticate the success of the 
attack. The large amount of false positives in the alert 
logs generates the course of taking corrective action for 
the true positives, i.e. delayed, successful attacks, and 
labor intensive. 
The normal and the abnormal intrusive activities 
in networked information processing systems are hard 
to forecast as the limits cannot be easily explained. This 
prediction process may generate false alerts in many 
anomaly based intrusion detection schemes. However, 
with the introduction of fuzzy logic, the false alarm rate in 
determining intrusive activities can be minimized; a set 
of fuzzy rules (noncrisp fuzzy classifiers) can be 
employed to identify the normal and abnormal behavior 
in computer networks, and fuzzy inference logic can be 
applied over such rules to determine when an intrusion 
is in progress. The primary problem with this procedure 
is to make good fuzzy classifiers to detect intrusions 
(Tillapart, 2002). 
The intrusion detection strategies concern four 
primary issues. First is the dataset that is captured from 
network communications. The second is Genetic 
Algorithms (GA) which use mutation, recombination, 
and selection applied to a population of individuals in 
order to evolve iteratively better and better solutions and 
a way to generate fuzzy rules to characterize normal and 
abnormal behavior of network systems. The third is to 
generate alerts and reports for malicious traffic behavior, 
and the fourth is the maintenance of the ids for 
observation of placement of sensors, and qualified 
trained intrusion analysts so that the latest malicious 
traffic is being detected. 
The following future trends are clearly visible in 
intrusion detection systems. 
• Genetic Algorithm (GA): GA is a programming 
technique that uses biological evolution as a 
problem solving strategy. It is based on Darwinian’s 
theory of evolution and survival of fittest to make 
effective a population of candidate result near a 
predefined fitness. The proposed GA based 
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intrusion detection system holds two modules 
where each acts in a dissimilar stage. In the training 
stage, a set of classification rules are produced 
from network audit data using the GA in an offline 
background. In the intrusion detection phase, the 
generated rules are employed to classify incoming 
network connections in the real-time environment. 
Once the rules are generated, the intrusion 
detection system becomes simple, experienced and 
efficient one. 
GA applies an evolution and natural selection that 
employs a chromosome-like data structure and 
evolve the chromosomes by means of selection, 
recombination and mutation operators. The process 
generally starts with randomly generated population 
of chromosomes, which signify all possible solution 
of a problem that are measured candidate 
solutions. From each chromosome different 
positions are set as bits, characters or numbers. 
These positions are regarded as genes. An 
evaluation function is employed to find the decency 
of each chromosome according to the required 
solution; this function is known as “Fitness 
Function”. During the process of evaluation 
“Crossover” is applied to have natural reproduction 
and “Mutation” is applied to mutation of species. 
For survival and combination the selection of 
chromosomes is partial towards the fittest 
chromosomes (Hassan, 2013). 
• Fuzzy Logic: A fuzzy expert system consists of three 
different types of entities: fuzzy sets, fuzzy variables 
and fuzzy rules. The membership of a fuzzy variable 
in a fuzzy set is determined by a function that 
produces values within the interval [0, 1]. These 
functions are called membership functions. Fuzzy 
variables are divided into two groups: antecedent 
variables, that are assigned with the input data of 
the fuzzy expert system and consequent variables, 
that are assigned with the results computed by the 
system. 
The fuzzy rules determine the link between the 
antecedent and the consequent fuzzy variables, and are 
often defined using natural language linguistic terms. 
For instance, a fuzzy rule can be” if the temperature is 
cold and the wind is strong then wear warm clothes”, 
where temperature and wind are antecedent fuzzy 
variables, wear is a consequent fuzzy variable and cold, 
strong and warm clothes are fuzzy sets (Hassan, 2013). 
The process of a fuzzy system has three steps. 
These steps are Fuzzification, Rule Evaluation, and 
Defuzzification. In the fuzzification step, the input crisp 
values are transformed into degrees of membership in 
the fuzzy sets. The degree of membership of each crisp 
value in each fuzzy set is determined by plugging the 
value into the membership function associated with the 
fuzzy set. In the rule evaluation step, each fuzzy rule is 
assigned with a strength value. The strength is 
determined by the degrees of memberships of the crisp 
input values in the fuzzy sets of antecedent part of the 
fuzzy rule. The defuzzification stage transposes the 
fuzzy outputs into crisp values. 
III. Conclusion 
The study focused on studying existing IDS and 
their usefulness in detecting and preventing attacks in 
any type of network and control traffic with the 
performance of the system to be improved as well. It is 
found that intrusion has different meaning and scenarios 
defining need of attack detection and prevention of 
attacks. 
Deterrence is the key to the value of IDS. The 
benefit of deploying an IDS depends on how much it 
prevents hackers from committing intrusions. Although 
IDSs are classified as detective controls because they 
detect attacks that were not prevented, they implicitly 
act as preventive controls by changing the behavior of 
attackers in the first place, and thus eliminating attacks. 
The presence of a network-based IDS can put 
hackers on notice that their actions may lead to legal 
action. Host-based systems provide very similar 
deterrent effect. People who know that their actions may 
be monitored are less likely to commit misuse. 
Optimally configured IDSs always provide non-
negative value to their adopters. By using the out-of-box 
configuration, firms may be taking the easy way out, but 
they may be hurting themselves. Current widespread 
complaint against IDSs is that they produce many false 
alarms: False positives are tremendous time wasters 
and drive up operational labor costs. 
IDS developers should also pay close attention 
to the configuration issue. They should design IDSs that 
are easy to configure, especially in light of high false 
positive rates associated with IDSs. Most vendors do 
not provide these data. Various groups, including 
academic institutions, research labs, and commercial 
organizations, have tested commercial and government 
sponsored IDS products. 
All the IT security concerns are integral part of 
security programs and therefore, should be carefully 
designed and deployed. Recently, organizations 
realized that it is impossible to eliminate all security 
risks. As a result, detection based systems have started 
to gain popularity in the IT security domain. Today, IDSs 
are the most popular detective controls. Although IDS 
has been the fastest-growing security product in the 
market for the last few years, the security community is 
uncertain about their value. 
An improperly configured IDS may encourage 
more hacking, resulting in a higher loss for the firm. An 
optimally configured IDS deters hackers, thus, reducing 
the need for investigation by security experts for security 
violations. To firms that are using default configuration 
© 2016   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
  
  
 
  
9
Y
e
a
r
20
16
Towards Configured Intrusion Detection Systems
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
V
I 
Is
su
e 
IV
 V
er
sio
n 
I 
  
 (
)
E
 
 
 
 
 
or that have not adopted an IDS because of doubts 
about its value, our results provide incentives to 
implement an appropriately configured IDS. 
IV. Limitations and Future Research 
Directions 
As with all models, the model parameters were 
common knowledge to the firm and users. One region 
that looks particularly interesting is games with 
incomplete information, in which either the assembly or 
the user is unsure about the other’s payoffs. This 
perspective allows incorporation of uncertainty about the 
nature of the game being played. 
It may be more realistic to consider a 
multiperiod model in which the firm revises its estimates 
every period based on its observations of the hacker’s 
strategy in previous periods. Such learning has been 
analyzed in game theory. 
Security experts take appropriate actions after 
receiving alarms from IDSs. This approach, also called 
passive response, is the current trend in commercial 
IDSs. Another response option is to let the IDS take an 
action without human intervention (active response). 
Current IDSs provide little or no guidance to security 
management once an attack has been identified. 
IDSs are here to stay, with billion dollar firms 
supporting the development of commercial security 
products and driving hundreds of millions in annual 
sales. Nevertheless, they remain hard to configure and 
operate and often can’t be effectively utilized by the very 
novice security personnel who demand to benefit from 
them most. 
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